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—courtships and marriages in the earl's family ; visits. ceremonial and friendly ; debts and difficulties of his sons and sons-in-law ; family bills ; and presents and their cost. We learn also about the education of the earl's sons and wards ; their journeys to London and their presentation at court ; their occasional illnesses, and even the physicking they endured. In short, we have a very full and detailed picture of life in the families of the wealthy at the close of the sixteenth and the opening of the seventeenth century ; and the student of social conditions will here gather much that is useful to him.

It is, however, to the student of economic conditions in Ireland that the book will appeal most strongly. The Great Earl found his fortune in the province of Munster. Little by little he became the greatest land-owner in that part of Ireland ; and he found the land a land of plenty and by no means the poverty-stricken, distressful country we are apt to consider it. The rivers were rich in fish and pearls ; the mountains in silver, copper, and iron ore and in timber, good for ship-building and for barrel staves. We are told that Richard Boyle was paid £4,600 for bar-iron exported to Amsterdam in 1623, and for silver mines leased in 1631 he received a rent in kind consisting of a fair basin and ewer, four dozen large silver plates, and eight great candlesticks. The earl also introduced tobacco culture into Ireland and set up glass and woolen works in his town of Youghal. In Youghal and also in his other three towns of Lismore, Bandon Bridge, and Clonakilty, which all owed their existence as towns to him, he settled English families ; and it was English not Irish industry which made this part of Ireland for a while so busy and prosperous. The Great Earl was no better than his times in his attitude toward the native and Catholic Irish ; but it is hard to decide whether it was for economic or religious reasons that he so rigorously excluded Catholics from his town demesnes. For many reasons the *Life of the Great Earl of Cork* is valuable as a contribution to Irish history of the period of the English plantation of Ireland.

A. G. PORRITT.

England in the Mediterranean : a Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power within the Straits, 1603-1713. By JULIAN S. CORBETT. (London, New York, and Bombay : Longmans, Green, and Company. 1904. Two vols., pp. ix, 342 ; ii, 351.)

THE author of this book belongs to the imperialistic school of historians, who write history with a tendency, and history with a tendency is not history, but a sermon based upon historic facts in the nature of things falsely apprehended. For Mr. Corbett sea-power is the supreme fact, and sea-power in the Mediterranean is the supremest of all facts. Consequently in his opinion England should have endeavored to be a Mediterranean power long before she became one. As a corollary, all English politicians who regarded the Mediterranean as a fit field for English action were great statesmen ; all who did not so regard it were

purblind creatures. In other words, he regards the entire past as having existed merely to create the society in which we live, as if this society were the last word to be spoken throughout all the ages. Whereas, if anything is certain, it is that the present condition of affairs, like all precedent conditions, is but a transition to another in which perhaps the Mediterranean policy of England will be as bitterly condemned by some future historian with a tendency as it is now lauded by Mr. Corbett. The statesmen of 300 years ago are not to be judged by the policies and ideas which prevail to-day. Statesmen ought to work for their day and not for any remote future, and historians ought to write for all time and not for any immediate present.

Another grievous shortcoming is the writer's insistence that, "as a rule, what did not happen is at least as important as what did". In what sense this is true it would be difficult to determine. It is certainly logical, however, if one holds the doctrine, to infer from it that its neglect has led to the ignoring of "the sweeping change in the European system which accompanied the appearance of Great Britain in the Mediterranean". The last sentence furnishes the clue to another vital error into which the writer constantly falls — a vulgar error of logical method, which consists in supposing that because two things occur in conjunction, therefore one occurs because of the other. It may be that England's appearance in the Mediterranean was accompanied by great changes in the European system, but the presumption that the appearance of England in the Mediterranean was the cause of these changes is unwarranted.

Finally, though Mr. Corbett has written several books, he is not a historian. He takes history seriously and he delves in the records, but he has little conception of what the writing of history really demands. It is not enough "to scorn delights and live laborious days" — one must also know what is the exact bearing of evidence in a given case, and in how far he can trust his authorities. That the writer has not a conception of these demands upon the historian it would be unjust to assert, but his use of his material is not scholarly. He gives references only semi-occasionally; his authorities do not always bear him out in his conclusions, and he does not weigh the evidence with anything like the skill, accuracy, and judgment demanded of a historian.

These general criticisms admit of constant proof throughout the work. Thus he takes Pepys's assertions when they are to his taste and rejects them when they are not, as in the case of Tangier, which Pepys rightly held to be untenable. His remarks on Captain Mainwaring are confused and are not supported by at least one of the authorities he quotes. The early Stuart period was a "colourless waste", in which only one naval expedition of any consequence was despatched. This was a "contemptible failure" in its declared object but it had an undeclared object "which gave the keynote of the century" (I, 3-4). It was the occasion on which "the navy of England first appeared in the Mediterranean". To assert that Cecil's expedition gave any such key-

note ; that it had any influence in bringing England permanently into the Mediterranean ; that it led any one anywhere at any time to regard the Mediterranean as a fit field for English naval enterprise is to assert what has no basis in fact. Again, the pirate Ward is held up to admiration because in his piratical excursions into the Mediterranean he was instrumental in causing the despatch of a Spanish fleet of "broadside ships" for the first time into that sea. This "marks a turning-point in naval history" (I, 16). Moreover, Ward by his acts in the Mediterranean begins the work which William III and Marlborough complete. It seems incredible that any one can believe that, without Ward, broadside ships would not have been used by Spain in the Mediterranean about the time when they were, or that Ward can in any sense be regarded as the originator of the work completed by Marlborough. Another pirate, Sir Walter Raleigh, is equally lauded, but with quite as little reason. Corbett admits that Raleigh was a pirate, but piracy was not then discreditable, "no more to be reprehended than is a secret treaty now" (I, 41). Such assertions are often met with, but they are false. Piracy was regarded as discreditable even in the age of Elizabeth. Raleigh, Corbett admits, was anxious to break the peace with Spain, and this was laudable because "it was the Reformation and the freedom of the New World that were at stake" (I, 42). This assertion is almost grotesque, for "the Reformation and the freedom of the New World" in no way depended upon a war between England and Spain at that moment. This is evident, because there was no war, and yet "the Reformation and the freedom of the New World" survived. It is impossible moreover to see how Raleigh had anything to do with the Mediterranean. It is true that Gondomar feared that Raleigh had designs upon that sea, but no such designs were actually held, so far as known. Mr. Corbett supposes that Gondomar's fear influenced Spanish naval policy materially, but there is no evidence of this.

Another epoch-making event is the permission given by King James to the Venetians in 1618 to hire a dozen English merchant-ships to assist their navy in the Adriatic. These ships were never secured, and King James gave a similar permission to the Spaniards. Yet Mr. Corbett holds that the Venetian attempt to hire ships led to the failure of Osuna to assist the so-called "Spanish Conspiracy" in Venice. Why? Because the Venetians attempted to hire the ships and the plot failed, failed because Osuna could not assist because the Spanish government was afraid of the English ships which never came. What makes this concatenation of causes and effects still more wonderful is that Mr. Corbett produces no evidence to show that Osuna was in any way connected with the plot, if there was a plot. All is assumption. Tremendous as was the immediate result of this small event, its real significance was yet more so, for "to all the strange aspects of that famous plot we must add one more, and see in it the first occasion on which England by her new sea power laid a mastering hand upon the old centres of dominion and had dimly revealed to her her most potent line of political action"

(I, 65). Naturally, since the premises are pure guesswork, the conclusion is pure nonsense, and one is not surprised on turning the page to find the author admitting that "at first sight it may appear that too much importance has been attached" to this episode. To this all may agree, especially when it is recalled that while the English ships stayed at home, the Dutch hired a dozen vessels to the Venetians. The uninitiated would suppose that credit, if due, is due the Dutch. Mr. Corbett evidently suspects it, for in combating the view he declares that it is "probable that the moral effect of the English demonstration had at least as much weight with the Mediterranean powers as the actual force exhibited by the Dutch" (I, 67-68). After the sentence quoted above about England's "new sea power" this is indeed "a lame and impotent conclusion", but the case can be paralleled over and over again in Mr. Corbett's work. The tremendous importance of an event or of a no-event is insisted upon, and then the reader finds embedded somewhere a dozen pages further along a second conclusion garnished with "ifs and ans", "sage provisos, sub-intents and saving clauses".

In 1618 the English prepared a squadron to enter the Mediterranean and attack the pirates there. What became of this squadron Mr. Corbett does not know. It does not appear to have gone anywhere or to have done anything, although two Dutch squadrons entered the Mediterranean about this time, and engaged and defeated a Spanish force. Conclusion: "the naval intervention of England and her ally in the Mediterranean had been a complete success" (I, 88). In 1621 Mansell enters the Mediterranean and fails in an attack upon Algiers. Conclusion: "the lesson was never forgotten, either at home or abroad; nor from that time forth did the potentiality of English action in the Mediterranean ever cease to be a factor in European diplomacy" (I, 133). In 1624 Richelieu requests James I to assist France with a fleet in the Mediterranean. This is "nothing else than an invitation from France to England that she should assert her yet unmeasured influence on continental policy by naval operations in the Mediterranean", and Richelieu, if he possessed prophetic vision, "must have lain uneasy the night he let the proposal go" (I, 138). Undoubtedly, although the ships "were to sail under the French flag, and to be in all respects a French force". The expedition never sailed, but it deserves mention, presumably because "as a rule, what does not happen is at least as important as what does".

These examples well illustrate the writer's fitness for his task, in so far at least as his work relates to the first half of the seventeenth century. Everywhere he is incoherent, self-contradictory; everywhere he emphasizes unimportant men and still more unimportant events; everywhere he sees the finger of destiny whenever the Mediterranean is mentioned by an Englishman. The work improves, however, as the writer comes down toward the close of the century. The treatment of Cromwell's operations in the Mediterranean is good; the story of Tangier is well told, although the author naturally overrates the importance of that posses-

sion. The truth is that Tangier was not, on his own showing, worth the keeping. The naval strategy of William III and of Marlborough is justly appreciated and clearly expounded; the real bearing of the Spanish succession question for England is recognized, while the story of the capture of Gibraltar is excellently told. The reason for this improvement in the writer's work is clear. He has reached a period in which England actually had a Mediterranean policy, and in which her acts in the Mediterranean actually had a significance for the future. He has also reached a period in which he no longer needs to trust to conjecture, but can build upon admitted facts.

R. C. H. CATTERALL.

The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898. Edited by EMMA HELEN BLAIR and JAMES A. ROBERTSON. Vol. XIV, 1605-1609. Vol. XV, 1609. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company. 1904. Pp. 341, 331.)

WE get, in Volume XIV, echoes of the strife between Archbishop Benavides and Governor-General Acuña, related also with the Chinese disturbances and the massacre of some 15,000 to 18,000 Chinese in Luzon in 1603. In consequence of this massacre and of the failure of the Spaniards to restore all the confiscated property of Chinese, a viceroy of China threatens in 1605 to come to Manila with a thousand junks and sweep the Spaniards out of the Orient. To his boast that his king governs all the land on which the moon and sun shine, Acuña answers that

the Spaniards have measured by palmos, and that very exactly, all the countries belonging to all the kings and lordships in the world. Since the Chinese have no commerce with foreign nations, it seems to them that there is no other country but their own, and that there is no higher greatness than theirs; but if he knew the power of some of the kings with whom my sovereign, the king of the Hespañas, carries on continual war, the whole of China would seem to him very small (p. 46).

We get also some hints in this volume of the Spanish efforts for the conversion of the Japanese, and some indications of why they failed, both in religious and commercial undertakings, in Japan. It is interesting to find the Council of the Indies saying in 1607 (p. 229): "It is well to keep the king of Japon friendly. . . . For if he were not so he would be the greatest enemy that could be feared, on account of the number and size of his realms, and the valor of the people therein, who are, beyond comparison, the bravest in all India."

Perhaps the most interesting of the documents presented in this volume (which are drawn mainly from the Seville archives, with a few also from the British Museum, the Simancas archives, the Royal Academy of History at Madrid, and the National Historical Archives at Madrid) is the account of the various expeditions in 1591 and 1607-1608 to Tuy, land of the head-hunters of Northern Luzon, through the very regions which a recent "explorer", A. H. Savage Landor, has described as if he were the first white man to see them. The editors' note about the Igor-